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AbstrAct. This article develops and defends the Wittgensteinian idea of basic 
moral certainty that I advanced in earlier writings (2008b; 2009). It seeks to 
defend the core of this idea against criticisms issued by those who are apprecia-
tive of Wittgenstein’s analysis of empirical certainty, but who argue that moral 
certainty is significantly disanalogous to empirical certainty. They maintain that 
there are no universal moral certainties, only localised (hence relative) certainties 
embedded in culturally and historically specific moral ‘language-games’. 
In response to these criticisms, I seek to argue for the universality and naturalism 
of basic moral certainty, focussing on the central case of the wrongness of 
killing.
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I.  IntroductIon
In some earlier work (2008b; 2009) I made the case for recognition of the phenomenon of ‘basic moral certainty’ and its implications for 
thinking about moral practices and judgement. This was based on the 
argument that the idea of moral certainty is a natural extension of Witt-
genstein’s (1975) penetrating observations on the phenomenon of ‘empir-
ical’ certainty. Wittgenstein famously distinguishes certainty from knowledge. 
According to this distinction, those of our true beliefs that are susceptible 
to justification, challenge and doubt can properly be called ‘knowledge’. 
But our lives, comportment and judgements show that there are many 
things of which we are certain in a very fundamental (basic) way, but 
which are immune to justification, challenge and doubt, and hence cannot 
be objects of first-personal knowledge. Moreover, these states of affairs 
– which Wittgenstein describes as ‘standing fast’ for us (they are the 
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grounds, hinges and pivots on which our practices and judgements stand 
and turn) – are not even amenable to propositional formulation, other 
than as a philosophical exercise to illustrate the phenomenon of “basic 
certainty” (Moyal-Sharrock, 2005). Wittgenstein’s observations were 
mostly directed at empirical phenomena which, for convenience, I refer 
to as objects of people’s ‘empirical certainty’. Wittgenstein occasionally 
looked at matters of temporal or logical certainty – but did not consider 
what I call ‘moral certainty’.
There are various ways in which my argument for moral certainty 
might be criticised. One might simply retort that the idea is hostage to 
the fortune of Wittgenstein’s radical epistemic critique of G. E. Moore, 
and that since one rejects this critique, the idea of moral certainty falls 
with it. But one can side with Moore’s celebrated ‘commonsense’ obser-
vations on our (supposedly certain) empirical ‘knowledge’ of the external 
world and its contents and reject Wittgenstein’s critique while acknowl-
edging the insightfulness of Wittgenstein’s explorations of the objects and 
circumstances of everyday ‘pre-intentional’ certainty, as does John Searle 
(2002, chapter 14). Moreover, there is also a straight Moorean version of 
the idea of moral certainty, as propounded by Renford Bambrough 
(1979). Bambrough replicates Moore’s hand-waving manoeuvre with the 
modification that he invokes instead a child about to undergo painful 
surgery, with the conclusion that this child should therefore be given an 
anaesthetic. Bambrough exhibits this as a moral proposition that we know 
to be certainly true. One could thus hold on to a notion of both empirical 
and moral certainty that traces back to Moore, without recourse to 
 Wittgenstein’s radical epistemology. But this, in my view, yields only a 
limited perspective on the role of empirical and moral certainty in our 
lives. The benefit of keeping the idea of moral certainty within the frame 
of Wittgenstein’s radical epistemology, I contend, is that it chimes har-
moniously with our actual moral phenomenology.
However, a more troublesome challenge to the idea of basic moral 
certainty comes from those philosophers who accept Wittgenstein’s idea 
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of basic empirical certainty but argue that moral certainty is significantly 
disanalogous to empirical certainty. Critics of the idea of basic moral 
certainty, such as Robert Brice (2013) and Steffan Rummens (2013), and 
proponents of different versions of moral certainty, such as Michael 
Kober (1997) and Rom Harre (2010), argue that there are no universal 
moral certainties. They maintain that there are only localised certainties 
embedded in culturally and historically specific moral language-games. 
They argue, moreover, Moreover, so they argue, that which is morally 
certain in one such language-game may be rejected or simply absent in 
another. For example, the belief that human beings have fundamental 
rights – to life, liberty, etc. – is a ‘local’ certainty of our modern western 
moral language-games, but does not feature in the moral language-games 
played by people at other times and places. Conversely, certainties that 
did feature in some of their language-games, such as those on slavery 
(Rummens 2013, 135), contravene our certainty on the inalienability and 
fundamentality of human rights. (I hasten to add that notions of inalien-
able and fundamental human rights are not included in my conception of 
basic moral certainty.)
The purpose of the present article is to reiterate the core ideas in the 
concept of basic moral certainty by defending it against some of the main 
criticisms that it has provoked. In particular, I will defend it against the 
arguments for moral certainty being relativistically limited to a plurality of 
cultural and historical contexts, and disjunctive from Wittgenstein’s treat-
ment of basic empirical certainties. I will thereby seek to bring out the 
universality and naturalism of basic moral certainty.
II.   bAsIc MorAl certAInty And the wrongness of KIllIng: A brIef 
restAteMent
The two central examples of basic moral certainty that I presented and 
explored previously were the badness of death and the wrongness of kill-
ing. I should add that the wrongness of unwarranted infliction of pain 
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and other forms of suffering are basic moral certainties too. In what fol-
lows, I shall concentrate mostly on the wrongness of killing, since it is 
this that has attracted most of the criticism (Burley [2010] endorses my 
claim that the wrongness of killing is a basic moral certainty, but argues 
against the claim that the badness of death is too).
A basic certainty is something that cannot be sensefully asserted, 
explained, justified, questioned, or denied first-personally; and indeed no-
one would even think of doing so outside of a philosophical debate on 
the phenomenon. That it is very wrong to kill an innocent and non-
threatening person, absent special excusing or justifying circumstances, is 
so fundamental to our human form of life and individual moral con-
sciousness as to be recalcitrant to propositional formulation. Here is a 
practical test for basic certainty status: for any candidate certainty, try to 
perform the kind of operation that Wittgenstein carried out on Moore’s 
examples. Imagine what you would make of someone asserting (outside 
of a philosophy seminar or some other special circumstance) “this is my 
hand”; or “I cannot be sure that this is my hand”; or “I know that this is 
my hand because I learned of its existence when I was very young and 
I know that it hasn’t been replaced by anyone else’s, or by a prosthetic 
replica”.
Likewise, imagine that someone asked you if you thought it wrong 
(absent special excusing or justifying circumstances) to kill people, and if 
you do, on what basis, for which reason, and what it is that makes killing 
people wrong. One does not actually have to imagine these things being 
asserted, questioned and justified, for there is a sizeable and growing 
philosophical literature that seeks to explain and justify why killing is 
wrong. I quoted some paradigmatic examples of this activity in an earlier 
paper and reiterate a selection here:
What makes killing wrong is that it causes premature death, and pre-
mature death is a misfortune because it deprives an individual of a 
future of value (Marquis 1997, 96).
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Murder [...] is harmful to its victim because it is an irreversible loss to 
the person who was murdered of functions necessary for his worth-
while existence (Levenbook 1984, 412).
What makes killing another human being wrong is its character as an 
irrevocable, maximally unjust prevention of the realization of the vic-
tim’s life-purposes (Young 1979, 519).
More recently, in an article on the wrongness of killing, Carlos Soto states 
that “[...] there is good reason to think that one of the features that make 
killing persons wrong is the imposition on a person’s sovereignty over her 
life” (2013, 551). Likewise, in a ‘feature article’ entitled “What Makes Kill-
ing Wrong?”, Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller answer their titular question 
with the explanation that what makes killing wrong is that it causes the 
victim’s “universal and irreversible disability” (2013, 3). Critical responses 
to this article by Jeff McMahan (2013) and David DeGrazia (2013) object 
that universal and irreversible disability does not capture what is distinc-
tively wrong with killing. For this, they counter, one needs a standard 
harm-based account that identifies the harm incurred as the loss of a 
future or the goods that the victim would have enjoyed had their future 
not been taken away by being killed (that is, an account of the kind 
advanced by Marquis, Levenbook, and Young quoted above and others 
not quoted here).
To my ears, and I’m sure also to the ears of non-philosophers, there 
is something deeply peculiar about these purported explanations. They 
evince in me the same kind of reaction as that reported by Wittgenstein 
in response to the empirical certainties exhibited by Moore: “[...] even 
though I find it quite correct for someone to say ‘Rubbish!’ and so brush 
aside the attempt to confuse him with doubts at bedrock, -- nevertheless, 
I hold it to be incorrect if he seeks to defend himself (using, e.g., the 
words ‘I know’)” (Wittgenstein 1975, 498). It is not that these purported 
explanations of the wrongness of killing are false; just like Moore’s asser-
tions, they state things that are true – it really is the case that the person 
killed suffers universal and irreversible disability, the loss of functions 
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necessary for worthwhile existence, etc. Rather, their peculiarity stands 
out in their bathetic discordance with the moral gravity of the wrongness 
of killing. I have found, upon reading these explanations to various audi-
ences, that they typically elicit a mirthful reaction – which is not what one 
would expect from a reaction to hearing about such a weighty matter as 
the wrongness of killing. I take it that the mirth evinced is the result of 
having one’s basic moral certainty agitated.
I maintain, then, that the wrongness of killing must be considered a 
basic moral certainty because its wrongness cannot sensefully be asserted, 
explained or doubted, and it (the certainty) serves as a fundamental con-
dition of human morality as such. To coin a well-worn spatial metaphor 
from the early Wittgenstein (reiterated in his ‘‘Lecture on Ethics’’ [1965]), 
we are here up against the limits of philosophical explanation, and the 
attempt to go beyond these limits yields patent absurdity. Even the mere 
assertion, outside of specialised philosophical language-games, that kill-
ing is wrong sounds decidedly odd. Again, what would you make of 
someone who suddenly opined in general discussion that “it’s wrong to 
kill people”? Would you not worry why on earth they would say such a 
thing? Is it any less odd than someone saying “It’s wrong to eat people”? 
In short, I conclude that our very notion of moral wrongness is grounded 
in our thinking, judging and saying that particular acts and practices are 
wrong because they unjustly inflict death, pain and other modes of suffer-
ing on people. To then ask: “And why is it wrong to kill and inflict pain 
gratuitously?” is rather like the unanswerable “Whys?” that 3-year olds 
notoriously persist in asking after perfectly definitive answers to their 
questions (one inexorably concludes that such infants have not yet 
learned how to play the language-games of asking questions and receiv-
ing answers).
I now want to look at the objections of critics who have denied that 
the wrongness of killing is a basic moral certainty of the same kind as 
‘empirical certainty’, and who maintain that there are no non-relativized 
moral certainties. 
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III.  MorAl versus eMpIrIcAl certAIntIes?
The very idea of there being any basic moral certainties has been called 
into question by Rummens who maintains that there is no “[...] full paral-
lel between the empirical and the moral realm” (2013, 136) This is because 
whereas one cannot violate or ignore an object of empirical certainty one 
can perform acts the moral wrongness of which is supposed by me to be 
a basic certainty. As Rummens puts it, “[...] the murderer is physically 
capable of violating the moral norm he himself endorses” [whereas] “it 
makes no sense at all to say that somebody who believes that human 
beings do not have wings can, in spite of that belief, still jump out of the 
window and simply fly off” (2013, 144).
My first rejoinder to this is to point out that in both the above cases 
the actor can in fact act in a way that goes against the moral and physical 
‘rule’ (moral and empirical certainty) that they themselves otherwise 
endorse. And in so doing both – the murderer and the would-be flier – 
will receive the negative sanctions that inevitably follow upon such acts. 
That is to say, one can jump out of a window while flapping one’s arms 
in a ‘flying’ motion (despite being certain that it won’t work), and suffer 
the empirical consequences. Likewise, one can violate the moral rule 
against killing, and suffer the normative sanction of guilt and punishment. 
Durkheim (1965) makes just this argument, pointing to the analogous 
negative consequences of violating what he calls ‘technical rules’ (rules 
that seek to protect people from the untoward consequences of mishan-
dling states of the physical world) and ‘moral rules’.
The murderer does not lose or give up their certainty that killing 
is morally wrong by committing murder. Indeed, whilst most of us no 
doubt possess the subjective certainty that we simply could not commit 
murder, empirical evidence provided by the social and historical 
 sciences, and the law courts, demonstrates that some thoroughly ordi-
nary and good people just like us do sometimes perform such acts. In 
a word, moral certainty is about what one should not do, not what one 
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cannot do – this is what Wittgenstein would call a grammatical remark 
or reminder about morality. On the other hand, I am not so sure that 
the objects of empirical certainty do impose themselves with an irresist-
ible force of a kind that the objects of basic moral certainty lack. Physi-
cal reality does not force me to believe that every human head has a 
brain inside it or that planet earth is more than 50 years old (there were 
people in the past that did not believe these things), any more than the 
moral and criminal rule prohibiting murder incapacitates me from com-
mitting it. Many basic empirical certainties are grounded in social belief, 
the forcefulness of which is normative, not physical. I am certain of 
these things not because I have personally carried out investigations to 
establish their truth, but because I live in an epistemic community in 
which everyone believes them, and either to doubt them or to take 
action to verify them would call into question my competence or 
sanity.
In a word, the basic moral certainty that killing is wrong is not vio-
lated by performing, or being able to perform, that act. Equally, doing, 
or being able to do, that which is morally wrong does not thereby exclude 
one from the certainty that it is wrong. It is, after all, commonplace for 
people to do things that they know to be wrong. And in the most extreme 
cases, both the severely cognitively impaired (insane) person and the emo-
tionally impaired (psychopathic) person stand out as deviants against our 
basic empirical and moral certainty. Thus I reject Rummens’ claim that 
moral certainty is disjunctively disanalogous to empirical certainty in vir-
tue of the recalcitrant physicality of the objects of empirical certainty 
versus the alleged voluntariness of the norms that prohibit wrongful killing. 
Such differences as there obviously are between the objects of basic empiri-
cal and basic moral certainty do not amount to a relevant difference 
between the respective states of certainty itself. Moreover, I will proceed 
to argue shortly that, in contrast to the normative source of much of our 
basic empirical certainty, the source of our basic moral certainty on the 
wrongness of killing is natural.
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IV.  relAtIVe MorAl certAInty?
Rummens, and Brice, draw attention to the ostensibly tricky fact of there 
being many places and times where a whole society is complicit in prac-
tices that inflict death and other modes of suffering on people we (now) 
regard as wholly innocent, undeserving victims. Such institutionalised 
practices as infanticide, witch-burning, child labour, the slave trade and 
slavery, colonialism, the Nazi Holocaust and other genocides, immedi-
ately come to mind. If the wrongness of killing is a basic moral certainty, 
why is it that so many people have acted and continue to act in ways that 
are so certainly morally wrong?
I start with the problem allegedly posed by historical and cultural 
relativism. Brice (2013, 480) insists that concepts like ‘innocent’ and ‘per-
son’ only make sense and have meaning within particular forms of life or 
moral language-games. Thus the claim that every competent agent is pos-
sessed of the basic moral certainty that it is wrong to kill innocent and 
non-threatening human persons overlooks the fact that what counts as 
innocent, non-threatening, and a person is chronically variable. He therefore 
contends that “[...] the wrongness of killing an innocent, non-threatening 
person is not a universally held certainty” (2013, 480); it is rather an item 
of “moral knowledge” (2013, 485) that is socially learned, and certain only 
“to those of us in this form of life” (2013, 483). Moreover, it is a convic-
tion that we “arrive at”, not “begin with” (2013, 485). Rummens adds the 
assertion that there are no basic moral certainties, only “[...] a plethora of 
radically incompatible moral language games that deny some or even 
most of the moral certainties we take for granted” (2013, 144).
I do not deny that the historical and cultural record seems to show 
a catalogue of radical differences in moral perception, judgment, action 
and institutionalised practice. These differences are so striking that one 
might well be tempted to conclude that there is no universally held cer-
tainty on the wrongness of killing and infliction of pain and suffering on 
innocents, because so much of it has gone on (at other times and in other 
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places). However, one does not really need to invoke this cultural and 
historical variability in order to make this case against basic moral cer-
tainty. For there are surely enough apparent exceptions to the wrongness 
of killing in our own familiar social world to cast doubt on the idea of 
basic moral certainty without needing to look elsewhere. The very same 
evidence that critics such as Rummens and Brice invoke from other soci-
eties can be found in our own society (paraphrasing Wittgenstein [1980, 
50]: one does not have to dig deep for such evidence; just take a look 
round our own familiar surroundings).
The core idea of what basic moral certainty consists in is that its 
object is the wrongness of killing, inflicting pain, etc. per se. But this basic 
certainty coalesces with the socially acquired belief that it is sometimes 
permissible, and sometimes even required, to kill and inflict pain on 
innocents, when apparently weighty reasons support or demand doing 
so. One would like to think that such reasons come into view only when 
even more innocent lives and suffering are at stake, such as with human-
itarian rescue or self-defence, but it is hard to see the many instances of 
killing of innocent civilians by our governments’ military forces properly 
falling under these categories. Indeed, for some time there has been in 
place the implicit calculation that the life of one member of our military 
forces has greater value than any number of another country’s civilians. 
Nevertheless, my point here is not to engage in social criticism – although 
that would undoubtedly be warranted – but just to observe that acknowl-
edgement of the permissibility of killing some innocent and non-(directly)
threatening people (for good reasons) sits cheek by jowl with the basic 
certainty that it is wrong to kill innocent and non-threatening people. 
This point is redolent of the one previously made about the murderer 
not ipso facto losing his or her certainty of the wrongness of killing. Thus 
I do not accept Rummens and Brice’s concession that we have (arrived 
at) a kind and degree of moral certainty of the wrongness of killing that 
others lack. I would say, rather, that all societies have it, and all allow 
some exceptions to it (albeit often quite different ones). To prosecute 
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this point I will consider two commonly cited historical episodes that 
supposedly exhibit a glaring absence of the basic moral certainty that it 
is wrong to kill and inflict pain on innocent and non-threatening 
people.
The wrongness of killing was surely not a basic moral certainty held 
by many in Nazi German society, was it? Didn’t that regime, with the aid 
of many of its citizens, engage in “[...] the systematic killing of huge num-
bers of innocent human beings” (Rummens 2013, 144)? Yes, of course it 
and they did. But so too did the British and American governments, with 
the aid of their citizenry. I do not want to make a cheap point about 
 possible moral equivalences. I do not need to claim anything so prepos-
terous as that the allies matched the moral crimes of Nazi Germany. 
Nevertheless, the allies did engage in what is aptly described as “[...] the 
systematic killing of huge numbers of innocent human beings” (in Dres-
den, Hamburg, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, among other places).
The Third Reich was indeed, to put it mildly, extraordinarily brutal 
in its attitude towards human life. So much was this the case that its 
degree of brutality might well be thought to have made that regime fatally 
unsustainable, as other extraordinarily brutal regimes have proven to be 
(this kind of argument has been advanced by Joshua Cohen [1997], and 
other moral realists, in explanation of the demise of institutionalised slav-
ery). Thus one might think that it was the acute disintegration of moral 
certainty on the wrongness of killing and infliction of pain on innocents 
that contributed significantly to the collapse of these regimes. In which 
case, the claim for the universality of basic moral certainty would be quali-
fied by the exception of pathologically genocidal and otherwise murder-
ous regimes, of which there have been many instances in 19th and 
20th century modern society.
However, I am more inclined to say that the societal membership of 
the Third Reich and kindred regimes was much the same as ours with 
regard to possession of basic moral certainty on the wrongness of killing. 
It is just that their citizens very quickly learned to admit far more 
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exceptions to it than normal modern societies allow. Consider here what 
historians have depicted as the process of rapid “cumulative radicaliza-
tion” (Mommsen 1997) in Nazi German society, beginning with the med-
ical provision of so-called ‘euthanasia’ for seriously disabled children 
upon parental request, and ending with genocidal death camps for Jews. 
Even so, I contend that the people of this society did not lose their basic 
moral certainty on the wrongness of killing. Rather, they learned to with-
draw that certainty from whole kinds of people who came to be re-cate-
gorised as dangerously threatening non-persons, whilst holding on to it 
for those that they continued to recognise as bona fide moral persons. 
Outrageous as it may sound, there is reason to think that the perpetrators 
conceived their genocidal killing as self-defensively motivated (see Scarre 
1998).
Let us consider next the case of the European slave trade, American 
slavery and the institution of slavery. The fact that modern colonial states 
and their peoples participated in these institutionalised practices is often 
held up as evidence that even in our recent history it was not considered 
wrong to seize, kill, incarcerate, torture and assault innocent and non-
threatening people, and to trade them as mere commodities on the com-
mercial market. Conversely, it is suggested that this evidence shows that 
the basic moral certainty of it being wrong to kill and inflict pain, etc. on 
innocent people is a recent acquisition of modern postcolonial democratic 
western societies. But I side here with Bernard Williams’ (1993) dismissal 
of such thinking as deluded ‘progressivism’. Indeed, some of the leading 
historians of slavery and abolition maintain that people’s powers of moral 
perception and judgment, and the core moral rules to which they sub-
scribe, have remained pretty constant at least since Ancient civilisation 
(Davis 1975; Haskell 1998; Williams 1993). That is to say, we modern 
people are no more (nor less) morally sensitive and sophisticated than our 
distant ancestors. The basic rules and imperatives of morality, that is, the 
golden rule of treating others as one would want to be treated oneself, 
and that it is wrong to hurt and kill people, are largely invariant. What is 
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subject to variation and change is the scope, range and circumstances of 
application of those rules (see Haskell’s [1998] detailed theoretical and 
historically illustrated argument for this conclusion).
These historians tell us that people in slave-owning and slave-trading 
societies were able to see that slaves suffered badly and that their existen-
tial condition was woeful. And yet, at the same time, the institutions that 
kept slaves in this condition were seen as perfectly just, or at least not 
unjust. Is this not incoherent and contradictory? No. Slavery was seen as 
a natural and inevitable feature of the social world for most of those who 
lived with it, and slaves were seen as a certain kind of restricted human 
being, suited only for enslavement. If this seems incredible, just reflect 
on our attitude now toward the millions of people we know to be dying 
from starvation and disease in some parts of the world. When we con-
template their fate (which we rarely spend time or energy doing) do we 
not feel genuine compassion and sympathy for them – alongside regret 
that there is nothing we can do to help (even though they could quite 
easily be helped), and then quickly change the subject? This ‘passive sym-
pathy’ for the victim, as Thomas Haskell (1998) calls it, looks quite famil-
iar to me, characterising many people’s attitude to such things as abortion, 
military action, road traffic injuries and fatalities, and the killing and vivi-
section of animals. I’m not saying that these institutionalised practices are 
morally wrong. My point rather is to observe that institutionalised prac-
tices through which death, suffering and incarceration is inflicted on inno-
cent and non-threatening beings can still appear to be just (or not unjust) 
to their hosts, because the practices are considered to be necessary and 
in some cases their victims lacking entitlement to the full moral status 
enjoyed by those whose interests the practices serve (see Pleasants [2010] 
for further argumentation on the ideas and claims in this paragraph). 
Thus the existence of institutionalised practices in one’s society through 
which innocent and non-threatening victims regrettably suffer pain and 
death does not subvert our basic moral certainty of the wrongness of 
killing and infliction of suffering as such.
— 210 —
 Ethical Perspectives 22 (2015) 1
ethical perspectives – march 2015
My central claim is that basic moral certainty on the wrongness of 
killing and infliction of pain transcends history and culture (and moral 
language-games). On this I find myself aligned with some socio- biologists, 
in regarding this certainty as akin to an innate disposition (whether it is 
actually biologically generated, or a ‘cultural universal’ that derives from 
social membership as such, I would not like to say). What is learned, and 
socially and culturally variable, I contend, are the discourses, language-
games, and mechanisms of mediation and distantiation through which 
people come to accept exceptions to, and suspensions of, their basic moral 
certainty of the wrongness of killing. I agree that the history of morals 
displays widespread variability of judgement and practice – but what is 
relative to time and place are ideas and beliefs on what is not to count as 
wrongful killing (very often on the grounds of a taken for granted natural-
ness, necessity, or unavoidability of the deaths involved) not the wrong-
ness of killing as such.
V.  of What, exActly, Are we bAsIcAlly MorAlly certAIn?
One manoeuvre in my attempt to rebut the ‘relativism’ objection to the 
idea of basic moral certainty has been to show that we are not signifi-
cantly different to our predecessors in terms of our attitudes to the 
wrongness of killing and infliction of pain and suffering on innocents. 
I then sought to argue that it is judgement on the categories of being and 
circumstances of death that are deemed exceptions to the wrongness of 
killing that is historically and culturally relative, not the wrongness of kill-
ing as such. But this throws up another problem, namely: given all the 
exceptions (both in our own and other people’s society) to it being wrong 
to kill innocent and non-threatening people, it is simply not true that 
people invariably hold the wrongness of killing as a basic moral certainty. 
Surely there are only a tiny number of people, namely pacifists, who 
exhibit an unqualified and unrestricted certainty over the wrongness of 
killing per se ? Actually, there is probably no pacifist either who believes 
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that all types of killing are morally wrong (e.g. including the killing 
of foetuses, animals, oneself, and chronically suffering patients in acts of 
voluntary euthanasia). One might think, therefore, that the list of possible 
exceptions to the wrongness of killing is so long that the idea that the 
wrongness of killing is a basic moral certainty suffers the death of a thou-
sand qualifications.
My initial response to this problem is that the general idea of basic 
certainty conceives this certainty as inhering in the unspoken and the 
taken for granted. Therefore, it is no great embarrassment to the concept 
of basic moral certainty that it is not possible to specify definitively which 
kinds of being, in which circumstances, certainty over the wrongness of 
killing includes and which it excludes. The concept of basic certainty 
requires no such explicitness. Being unsure about outlying or unusual 
cases and the scope of a concept need not destroy one’s confidence in 
perceiving and judging usual and paradigmatic cases.
The substantial question though is not the formulability of the pre-
cise range of cases and circumstances to which basic moral certainty 
applies, but whether we can be morally certain about something that 
admits as many exceptions as the wrongness of killing seemingly does. 
Once could claim that many of the apparent exceptions to the wrongness 
of killing are not really exceptions because these killings are done as the 
‘lesser of two evils’ to save a greater number, or higher value, of lives of 
other innocent and non-threatening people. I have already conceded that 
many of these apparently justified killings are justified only on pretty 
flimsy reasons. So how can we be said to hold basic moral certainty of 
the wrongness of killing when we allow, collude or participate in so many 
acts and practices that cause the deaths of innocent people, often for 
quite lightweight reasons? Three possible responses to this question come 
to mind. One is that because of our tolerance of the innocent being killed, 
not only are we not certain of the wrongness of killing, we do not believe 
it to be wrong as such at all. Another response is to concede that, in virtue 
of our having basic moral certainty over the wrongness of killing innocent 
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and non-threatening people and allowing exceptions to it, our moral psy-
chology is contradictory and incoherent. The third response, which I 
favour, is that there is no incompatibility, contradiction or incoherence in 
both having basic moral certainty that killing is wrong and allowing it to 
be permissible in some cases. I will now offer a defence of this response.
Despite our complicity in widespread killing and suffering, it remains 
the case that the vast majority of people, in normal circumstances, eschew 
and abhor personal participation in it. Phenomenologically, when perceiv-
ing or reflecting on cases even of killings that one takes to be justified, the 
experience of the act’s abhorrence is automatic for most people (consider, 
for example, the emotional and visceral reactions of Himmler and 
 Eichmann to witnessing scenes of mass killings that they believed to be 
fully justified [see Arendt 1963]). The judgment that a killing is justified 
inheres in a cognitive process that is quite distinct from the immediate 
experience of the act’s abhorrence (see Cushman, et al. 2012). I take this to 
be evidence of the basicness of our certainty that killing as such is wrong.
The widespread complicity in killing and suffering to which I have 
drawn attention admits of some mitigation in terms of its implication for 
the idea of basic moral certainty. People are motivated by a wide range 
of interests, and the interest in being morally good, or even morally 
decent, is only one among them. Moral reasons for acting are of course 
august and powerful ones, but philosophers are often tempted to engage 
in what Wittgenstein might call the ‘sublimation’ of the concept of a 
moral reason. That is, moral reasons are sometimes presented as having 
irresistible and indefeasible force – if one recognises a moral reason for 
not doing X, then one cannot reasonably do anything other than not-X.
But we know that people are weak, and they often do not, or are 
unable to, do what they themselves believe they should. People are also 
inveterately self-interested and limited in concern for others to those with 
whom they have ‘special ties’ of obligation or affection – and many moral 
and political philosophers think reasonably so. These factors generate 
powerful psychological strategies for avoiding or not recognising moral 
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reasons for critical action when such action would come at a certain cost. 
Thus it is that, so long as one does not participate at all directly in killing, 
one’s basic moral certainty that killing is wrong is undisturbed by all those 
exceptions of which one may be only dimly aware. Moreover, the insti-
tutionalised practices of one’s society through which much killing and 
suffering is inflicted on innocents are structured and organised in such a 
way as to make it genuinely hard for people to see or acknowledge its 
occurrence. Indeed, the sheer fact of institutionalisation (the form that 
nearly all exceptions to the wrongness of killing take) makes for a resilient 
shield that prevents citizens from perceiving possible wrongdoing being 
done in and by their society, or their personal complicity in it (see 
 Pleasants 2008a). But even if one does manage to see through the con-
ventionality that provides moral legitimation for institutionalised practices 
that inflict death and suffering on innocents, and still fail to act against 
them, one continues to be certain of the moral wrongness of killing while 
regretting one’s socially structured complicity in it. This is the social 
equivalent of the murderer not ipso facto revealing a lack of basic moral 
certainty over the wrongness of killing (which is not to say that personal 
complicity in institutionalised killing and suffering is morally equivalent 
to being a murderer). 
VI.  conclusIon
I end with some brief speculative observations on what I believe to be 
welcome implications of the idea of basic moral certainty. It is, I think, a 
thoroughgoingly naturalistic concept (there are pronounced naturalistic 
undertones to Wittgenstein’s own observations in On Certainty). Our basic 
empirical certainties, as pointed out by other Wittgensteinian scholars, are 
grounded in the fundamental physicality and temporality of the world in 
which we live. Likewise, our basic moral certainties, I contend, are 
grounded in our biological and social nature. We are finite, sentient, vul-
nerable creatures, or in MacIntyre’s nice turn of phrase, “dependent 
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rational animals” (2013). Basic moral certainty is a reflection of our human 
social nature, our deepest collective interest in living together coopera-
tively, productively, harmoniously, and in a way that enables us to flourish 
both individually and collectively. History shows an astonishing growth 
in the power and sophistication of our empirical knowledge; I think it 
also exhibits palpable growth in ‘moral knowledge’ (broadly conceived), 
as graphically illustrated in the image of the expanding moral circle that 
Peter Singer (1983) took over and popularised from the nineteenth cen-
tury historian W.E.H. Lecky. Of course, there remain many morally bad 
states of affairs. The idea of basic moral certainty, I submit, both makes 
best sense of our collective moral development, and is an important way 
of grounding progressive moral dispute and argument.1
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notes
1. I am grateful to the journal’s three referees for this paper whose reports have helped me 
to effect what I think are significant improvements on the original submission.

